We specify an experts algorithm with the following characteristics: (a) it uses only feedback from the actions actually chosen (bandit setup), (b) it can be applied with countably infinite expert classes, and (c) it copes with losses that may grow in time appropriately slowly. We prove loss bounds against an adaptive adversary. From this, we obtain master algorithms for "active experts problems", which means that the master's actions may influence the behavior of the adversary. Our algorithm can significantly outperform standard experts algorithms on such problems. Finally, we combine it with a universal expert class. This results in a (computationally infeasible) universal master algorithm which performs -in a certain sensealmost as well as any computable strategy, for any online problem.
Introduction
Expert algorithms have been popular since about fifteen years ago [LW89] . They are appropriate for online prediction or repeated decision making or repeated game playing (we call these setups online problems for brevity), based on a class of "experts". In each round, each expert gives a recommendation. From this, we derive a master decision. After that, losses (or rewards) are assigned to each expert by the environment, also called adversary. Our goal is to perform almost as well as the best expert in hindsight in the long run. In other words, we try to minimize the regret.
The early papers deal with the full information game, where we get to know the losses of each expert after each round. The analysis holds for the worst case, where the environment is fully adversarial and tries to maximize our regret in the long run. Later, [ACBFS95] gave a worst-case analysis for the bandit setup, where the master algorithm knows only the loss of its own decision after each round. This has been further generalized to label-efficient prediction [HP97] and partial monitoring [CBLS04] .
Recently, [FM04] introduced a strategic experts algorithm which performs well for a broader class of environments. The algorithm has still asymptotically optimal properties against a worst-case adversary. Additionally, it may perform much better than a standard experts algorithm in more favorable situations, when the actions influence the behavior of the environment. We refer to these as active experts problems. One example is the repeated prisoner's dilemma when the opponent is willing to cooperate under certain conditions (see Section 5 for some details). However, [FM04] give only asymptotic guarantees, but no convergence rate.
In this paper, we introduce a different algorithm for active experts problems with the same asymptotic guarantees, but in addition a convergence rate (of t − 1 10 ) is shown. Both algorithm and analysis are assembled from a standard "toolkit", basing on [KV03, MB04] . The basic idea is the following: We use the bandit experts algorithm by [MB04] , but allow the losses to increase with time t. This allows us to give control to one expert for an increasing period of time steps.
Secondly, we generalize our analysis to the case of infinitely many experts, basing on [HP04b] . The master algorithm stays computable (if the experts are), since only a finite (with time increasing) number of experts is involved. Allowing infinitely many experts also permits to define a universal expert class by means of all programs on some universal Turing machine. (This construction is quite common in Algorithmic Information Theory, see e.g. [Hut04] .) Thus, we obtain a universal master algorithm, which we show to perform in a certain sense almost as well as any computable strategy on any online problem. Thus, we introduce a new approach to universal artificial intelligence, which is in a sense dual to the AIXI model based on Bayesian learning [Hut04] . Although the master algorithm is computable, the resulting universal agent is not (like the AIXI model), since the experts may be non-responsive.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem setup, the notation, and the algorithm. In Sections 3 and 4, we give the (worst-case) analysis for finite and infinite expert classes. The implications to active experts problems and a universal master algorithms are given in Section 5. Section 6 contains discussion and conclusions.
The Algorithm
Our task is an online decision problem. That is, we have to make a sequence of decisions, each of which results in a certain loss we incur. "We" is an abbreviation for the master algorithm which is to be designed. For concreteness, you may imagine the task of playing a game repeatedly. In each round, i.e. at each time step t, we have access to the recommendations of n∈N∪{∞} "experts" or strategies. We do not specify what exactly a "recommendation" is -we just follow the advice of one expert. Before we reveal our move, the adversary has to assign losses ℓ i t ≥ 0 to all experts i. There is an upper bound B t on the maximum loss the adversary may use, i.e. ℓ t ∈ [0,B t ]
n . This quantity may depend on t and is known to us. After the move, only the loss of the selected expert i is revealed. This is the bandit setup, as opposed to the full information game where we get to know the losses all experts. Our goal is to perform nearly as well as the best available strategy in terms of cumulative loss, after any number T of time steps which is not known in advance. The difference between our loss and the loss of some expert is also termed regret. We consider the general case of an adaptive adversary, which may assign losses depending on our past decisions.
If there is a finite number n of experts or strategies, then it is common to give no prior preferences to any of them. Formally, we define prior weights w i = 1 n . Moreover, we define the complexity of expert i as k i = −lnw i . This arises in the full observation game, where the regret can be bounded by some function of the best expert's complexity. On the other hand, if there are reasons not to trust all strategies equally in the beginning, we may use a non-uniform prior w. This is mandatory for infinitely many experts. We then require w i > 0 for all experts i and i w i ≤ 1. Our algorithm "Follow or Explore" (FoE ) builds on McMahan and Blum's online geometric optimization algorithm. (For finite n and uniform prior, it even is their algorithm, save for the adaptive parameters.) It is a bandit version of a "Follow the Perturbed Leader" experts algorithm. This approach to online prediction and playing repeated games has been pioneered by [Han57] . For the full observation game, [KV03] gave a very elegant analysis which is distinct from the standard analysis of exponential weighting schemes. It is particularly handy if the learning rate is dynamic rather than fixed in advance. A dynamic learning rate is necessary if there is no target time T known in advance.
The algorithm is composed of two standard ingredients: exploration and follow the (perturbed) leader. Since we are playing the bandit game (as opposed to the full information game), we need to explore sufficiently. Otherwise, there could be a strategy which we think is poor (and thus never play), but in reality it is good. At each time step t, we decide randomly according to some exploration rate γ t ∈ (0,1) whether to explore or not. If so, we choose an expert according to the uniform distribution (or the prior distribution, compare (5), in case of non-uniform priors). After observing the loss of the selected expert, we want to give an unbiased estimate of the true loss vector. We achieve that by dividing the observed loss by the probability of exploring this expert, and estimate the unobserved losses of all other experts by zero. We call the resulting loss vectorl t .
When not exploring, we follow some strategy which performed well in the past. It may be not advisable to pick always the best strategy so far -the adversary could fool us in this case. Instead we introduce a perturbation for each expert and follow the advice of the strategy with the best perturbed score. In order to assign a score to each expert, note that we have only access to the estimated lossesl t . Let ℓ Note that each time randomness is used, it is assumed to be independent of the past randomness. Note also that all algorithms occurring in this paper work with the estimated lossesl. We may evaluate their performance in terms of true or estimated losses, this is specified in the notation. E.g. for the true loss of FPL up to and including time T we write L FPL = ℓ 
Analysis for Uniform Prior
In this section we assume a uniform prior w ≡ 1 n over finitely many experts. (The general case is treated in the next section.) We assume that B t ≥ 0 is some sequence of upper bounds on the true losses, γ t ∈ (0,1) is a sequence of exploration rates, and η t > 0 is a decreasing sequence of learning rates.
The analysis is according to the following diagram:
The symbol L is used informally for the cumulative loss ℓ 1:T . Each " < ∼ " means that we bound the quantity on the left by the quantity on the right plus some additive terms. The first and the last expressions are the losses of the FoE algorithm and the best expert, respectively. The intermediate quantities belong to different algorithms, namely FoE , FPL, and a third one called IFPL for "infeasible" FPL [KV03] . IFPL is the same as FPL except that it has access to an oracle providing the current estimated loss vectorl t (hence infeasible). Then it assigns scores of η tl
We assume that IFPL uses the same randomization as FPL (i.e. the respective q t are the same).
The randomization of FoE and FPL gives rise to two filters of σ-algebras. By A t for t ≥ 0 we denote the σ-algebra generated by the FoE 's randomness {u 1:t ,r 1:t } up to time t. We may also write A = t≥0 A t . Similarly, B t is the σ-algebra generated by the FoE 's and FPL's randomness up to time t (i.e. B t ={u 1:t ,r 1:t ,q 1:t }). Then clearly A t ⊂ B t for each t.
The arguments below rely on conditional expectations -the expectations in (1) should also be understood conditional. In particular we will often need the conditional expectations with respect to FoE 's past randomness A t−1 , abbreviated as We now start proving the diagram (1). It is helpful to consider each intermediate algorithm as a standalone procedure which is actually executed (with an oracle if necessary) and has the asserted performance guarantees (e.g. in terms of expected losses).
Lemma 1 L
FoE < ∼ EL FoE For each T ≥ 1 and δ T ∈ (0,1), with probability at least 1− δT 2 , we have
Proof. The sequence of random variables
is a martingale with respect to the filter B t (not A t !). In order to see this,
Its differences are bounded: |X t −X t−1 | ≤ B t . Hence, it follows from Azuma's inequality that the probability that X T exceeds some λ> 0 is bounded by p= 2exp − The relation EL FoE < ∼ EL FPL follows immediately from the specification of the algorithm FoE .
Lemma 2 EL
The next lemma relating EL FPL and EL FPL is technical but intuitively clear. It states that in (conditional) expectation, the real loss suffered by FPL is the same as the estimated loss. This is simply because the loss estimate is unbiased. A combination with the previous lemma was shown in [MB04] .
Lemma 3 EL
] be the probability distribution over actions i which FPL uses at time t, depending on the past randomness A t−1 . Let u t = [1...1]/n be the uniform distribution at time t (for non-uniform weights this will be replaced appropriately later). Then
is the estimated loss under the condition that FoE decided to explore (r t = 1) and chose action I FoE t = i.
2
The following lemma from [KV03] relates the losses of FPL and IFPL. We repeat the proof, since it is the crucial and only step in the analysis where we have to be careful with the upper loss bound B t . LetB t = B t (n/γ t ) denote the upper bound on the instantaneous estimated losses.
Lemma 4 EL
holds for all t ≥ 1.
Proof. If r t = 0,l t = 0 and thusl
holds. This happens with probability 1− γ t . Otherwise we have
where µ denotes the (exponential) distribution of the perturbations, i.e. x i := q i t and density µ(x) := e − x ∞ . The idea is now that if action i was selected by FPL, it is -because of the exponentially distributed perturbation -with high probability also selected by IFPL. Formally, we write u + = max(u,0) for u ∈ R, abbreviate λ =l <t + k/η t , and denote by ...dµ(x =i ) the integration leaving out the ith action. Then, using η t λ i −x i ≤ η t λ j −x j for all j if I 
Summing over i and using the analogue of (2) for IFPL, we see that if r t = 1, then E tl
The assertion now follows by taking expectations w.r.t r t .
The next lemma relates the losses of IFPL and the best action in hindsight. For an oblivious adversary (which means that the adversary's decisions do not depend on our past actions), the proof was given in [KV03] . An additional step is necessary for an adaptive adversary. We omit the proof here, the reader may reconstruct it from the proof of Lemma 9. 
1:T is a random variable depending on A t ).
Finally, we give a relation between the estimated and true losses, adapted from [MB04] .
best For each T ≥1, δ T ∈(0,1), and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, w.p. at least 1− δT 2 we havê
Proof. X t =l i 1:t −ℓ i 1:t is a martingale, since
Its differences are bounded: |X t − X t−1 | ≤B t . By Azuma's inequality, its actual value at time T does not exceed (2ln
We now combine the above results and derive an upper bound on the expected regret of FoE against an adaptive adversary. Proof. The first high probability bound follows by summing up all excess terms in the above lemmas, observing thatB t =B t (n/γ t ). For the second bound on the expectation, we take expectations in Lemmas 2-5, while Lemma 1 is not used. For Lemma 6, a statement in expectation is obtained as follows: (3) 
for all i and T . Here, (ii) and (iv) hold with probability 1−T −2 . Moreover, in both cases (bounded and growing B t ) FoE is asymptotically optimal, i.e. B t = t 1 8 in (iii) and (iv) is just one choice to achieve asymptotic optimality while the losses may grow unboundedly. Asymptotic optimality is sometimes termed Hannan-consistency, in particular if the limit equals zero. We only show the upper bound.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow by applying the previous theorem to η t =t
−2 , and observing
. In order to obtain (iii) and (iv), set η t = t , and δ T = T −2 . The asymptotic optimality finally follows from the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, since
for an appropriate C > 0 according to (ii) and (iv 
Infinitely Many Experts and Arbitrary Priors
The following considerations are valid for both finitely and infinitely many experts with arbitrary prior weights w i . For notational convenience, we write n = ∞ in the latter case. When admitting infinitely many experts, two difficulties arise: Since the prior weights of the experts sum up to one and thus become arbitrarily small, the estimated losses -obtained by dividing by these weights -would possibly get arbitrarily large. We therefore introduce, for each expert i, a time τ i ≥1 at which the expert enters the game. All algorithms FoE , FPL, IFPL are substituted by counterparts FoE τ , FPL τ , IFPL τ which use expert i only for t≥ τ i . Thus, the maximum estimated loss possibly assigned to these active experts iŝ
We denote the set of active experts at time t by {t ≥ τ } = {i : t ≥ τ i }. Experts which have not yet entered the game are given an estimated loss ofB t . This also solves the computability problem: Since at every time t only a finite number of experts is involved, FoE τ is computable (if each expert is). The algorithms FoE τ and FPL τ are specified in Figures 3 and 4 .
Again, the analysis follows the outline (1). Lemmas 1-4 have equivalent counterparts, the proofs of which remain almost unchanged. In Lemma 3, the "uniform" distribution over experts u t now becomes
The upper bound on the estimated lossB t in Lemma 4 is given by (4). We only need to prove assertions corresponding to Lemmas 5 and 6. 
Proof. This is a modification of the corresponding proofs in [KV03] and [HP04b] . We may fix the randomization A and suppress it in the notation. Then we only need to show
where the expectation is with respect to IFPL's randomness q 1:T .
Assume first that the adversary is oblivious. We define an algorithm A as a variant of IFPL τ which samples only one perturbation vector q in the beginning and uses this in each time step, i.e. q t ≡ q. Since the adversary is oblivious, A is equivalent to IFPL τ in terms of expected performance. This is all we need to show (6). Let η 0 = ∞ and λ t =l t +(k −q)
We argue by induction that for all T ≥ 1,
This clearly holds for T = 0. For the induction step, we have to show
The inequality is obvious if I
shows (8). Rearranging terms in (7), we see
The assertion (6) -still for oblivious adversary and q t ≡ q -then follows by taking expectations and using
Here, ( * ) holds because τ i depends monotonically on k i , and Eq i =1, and maximality ofl Sampling the perturbations q t independently is equivalent under expectation to sampling q only once. So assume that q t are sampled independently, i.e. that IFPL τ is played against an oblivious adversary: (6) remains valid. In the last step, we argue that then (6) also holds for an adaptive adversary. This is true because the future actions of IFPL τ do not depend on its past actions, and therefore the adversary cannot gain from deciding after having seen IFPL τ 's decisions. (For details see [HP04a] . Note the subtlety that the future actions of FoE τ would depend on its past actions.) 2
and 1≤i≤n, we havel
This corresponds to Lemma 6. The proof proceeds in a similar way: we have to note thatl 
with probability 1 − δ T , where w * t = min{w i : t ≥ τ i }.
A corresponding statement holds for the expectation (compare Theorem 7).

Corollary 12 Assume the conditions of Theorem 11.
Then for all i and T , the following holds w.p. 1−δ T .
√ ln T , and Proof. Let η t = t , and 
Active Expert Problems and a Universal Master Algorithm
If the adversary's goal is just to maximize our (expected) regret, then it is well known what he can achieve (at least for uniform prior, see e.g. the lower bound in [CB97, ACBFS02] ). We are interested in different situations. An example is the repeated playing of the "Prisoner's dilemma" against the Tit-for-Tat 1 strategy [FM04] . If we use two strategies as experts, namely "always cooperate" and "always defect", then it is clear that always cooperating will have the better long-term reward. It is also clear that a standard expert advice or bandit master algorithm will not discover this, since it compares only the losses in one step, which are always lower for the defecting expert.
We therefore propose to give the control to a selected expert for periods of increasing length. Precisely, we introduce a new time scalet at which we have single games with losseslt. The master's time scale t does not coincide witht. Instead, at each t, the master gives control to the selected expert i forT t single games and agent is not computable, since we cannot check if a program halts. It is however straightforward to impose a bound on the computation time which for instance increases rapidly in t. If used with computable experts, the algorithm is computationally feasible. The universal master algorithm performs well with respect to any computable strategy.
Corollary 14
Assume the universal set of experts specified in the last paragraph. If FoE τ T is applied with γ t = t 
Discussion
For large or infinite expert classes, the bounds we have proven are irrelevant in practice, although asserting almost sure optimality and even a convergence rate: the exponential of the complexity is far too huge. Imagine for instance a moderately complex task and some good strategy, which can be coded with mere 500 bits. Then its weight is 2 −500 , a constant which is not distinguishable from zero in all practical situations. Thus, it seems that the bounds can be relevant at most for small expert classes with uniform prior. This is a general shortcoming of bandit experts algorithms: For uniform prior a lower bound on the expected loss which is linear in √ n has been proven [ACBFS02] .
If the bounds are not practically relevant, maybe the algorithms are so? We leave this interesting question unanswered. Intuitively, it might seem that the algorithms proposed here are too much tailored towards worst-case bounds and fully adversarial setups. For example, the exploration rate of t − 1 4 is quite high. Master algorithms which are less "cautious" might perform better for many practical problems. Finally, it would be nice to investigate the differences between the proposed expert style approach and other definitions of universal agents, such as by [Hut04] .
